Many proteins responsible for genome maintenance interact with one another via short sequence motifs. The best known of these are PIP motifs, which mediate interactions with the replication protein PCNA. Others include RIR motifs, which bind the translesion synthesis protein Rev1, and MIP motifs, which bind the mismatch repair protein Mlh1. Although these motifs have similar consensus sequences, they have traditionally been viewed as separate motifs, each with their own target protein. In this article, we review several recent studies that (...) challenge this view. Taken together, they imply that these different motifs are not distinct entities. Instead, there is a single, broader class of motifs, which we call “PIP‐like” motifs, which have overlapping specificities and are capable of binding multiple target proteins. Given this, we must reassess the role of these motifs in forming the network of interacting proteins responsible for genome maintenance. (shrink)

Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart invites readers to embark on a new journey into a land of rationality that differs from the familiar territory of cognitive science and economics. Traditional views of rationality tend to see decision makers as possessing superhuman powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and all of eternity in which to ponder choices. To understand decisions in the real world, we need a different, more psychologically plausible notion of rationality, and this book provides it. It is about (...) fast and frugal heuristics--simple rules for making decisions when time is pressing and deep thought an unaffordable luxury. These heuristics can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices, classifications, and predictions by employing bounded rationality. But when and how can such fast and frugal heuristics work? Can judgments based simply on one good reason be as accurate as those based on many reasons? Could less knowledge even lead to systematically better predictions than more knowledge? Simple Heuristics explores these questions, developing computational models of heuristics and testing them through experiments and analyses. It shows how fast and frugal heuristics can produce adaptive decisions in situations as varied as choosing a mate, dividing resources among offspring, predicting high school drop out rates, and playing the stock market. As an interdisciplinary work that is both useful and engaging, this book will appeal to a wide audience. It is ideal for researchers in cognitive psychology, evolutionary psychology, and cognitive science, as well as in economics and artificial intelligence. It will also inspire anyone interested in simply making good decisions. (shrink)

Polls suggest up to twenty percent of Americans describe their beliefs as 'libertarian', but libertarians are often derided as heartless Social Darwinists or naïve idealists. This illuminating handbook brings together scholars from a range of fields and political perspectives to consider how classical liberal principles can help us understand and potentially address a variety of pressing social problems including immigration, climate change, the growth of the prison population, and a host of others. Anyone interested in political theory or practical law (...) and politics will find this book an essential resource for understanding this major strand of American politics. (shrink)

There can be no doubt that discrimination based on sex, race, ethnicity, religion or beliefs should not be tolerated in academia. Surprisingly, however, in recent years, policies of Diversity, Inclusion and Equity (DIE), officially introduced to counteract discrimination, have increasingly led to quite the opposite result: the exclusion of individuals who do not share a radical 'woke' ideology on identity politics (feminism, other gender activisms, critical race theory, etc.), and to the suppression of the academic freedom to discuss such dogmas. (...) This subversion of academia — disguised Trojan-horse style as universal human rights advocacy — is unacceptable because academia must be politically neutral and protect freedom of speech, a cornerstone of professional scholarly activity without which universities as we know them will slowly but surely suffocate. Our purpose here is to put together some particularly illustrative cases of such repression in a single book, testifying to a ubiquitous trend within western culture, irreducible to a few isolated complaints. The essays contained here illustrate the abuse of power, censorship and witch-hunts at many universities and research centres in the name of DIE. List of coauthors in alphabetical order: Dorian Abbot, Tomonori Agoh, Gerhard Amendt, Ivar Arpi, David Benatar, Peter Boghossian, Civitas Research Team, David Díaz Pardo de Vera, Pedro Domingos, Janice Fiamengo, Étienne Forest, Jorge Gibert Galassi, Norman Goldstuck, José L. González Quirós, Lawrence M. Krauss, Patrick LaBelle, Martín López Corredoira, Heather Mac Donald, Martin Malmgren, Jordan Peterson, Constantin Polychronakos, Erik. J. Olsson, Philip C. Salzman, Alessandro Strumia, Tom Todd, Andrei Yafaev. (shrink)

Is cognition an exclusive property of the individual or can groups have a mind of their own? We explore this question from the perspective of complex adaptive systems. One of the principal insights from this line of work is that rules that govern behavior at one level of analysis can cause qualitatively different behavior at higher levels. We review a number of behavioral studies from our lab that demonstrate how groups of people interacting in real-time can self-organize into adaptive, problem-solving (...) group structures. A number of principles are derived concerning the critical features of such “distributed” information processing systems. We suggest that while cognitive science has traditionally focused on the individual, cognitive processes may manifest at many levels including the emergent group-level behavior that results from the interaction of multiple agents and their environment. (shrink)

Is cognition an exclusive property of the individual or can groups have a mind of their own? We explore this question from the perspective of complex adaptive systems. One of the principal insights from this line of work is that rules that govern behavior at one level of analysis can cause qualitatively different behavior at higher levels . We review a number of behavioral studies from our lab that demonstrate how groups of people interacting in real-time can self-organize into adaptive, (...) problem-solving group structures. A number of principles are derived concerning the critical features of such “distributed“ information processing systems. We suggest that while cognitive science has traditionally focused on the individual, cognitive processes may manifest at many levels including the emergent group-level behavior that results from the interaction of multiple agents and their environment. (shrink)

While there has been a great deal of discussion of whether and when beliefs formed in an epistemically circular manner can be justified, there has been almost no discussion of exactly which beliefs are formed in a circular manner. These discussions have tended to focus on an extremely limited number of intuitively-identified paradigm examples concerning attempts to establish the reliability of a method of belief formation. Here, I seek to answer a prior analytical question about the nature of epistemic circularity (...) by developing a criterion which sorts epistemically circular beliefs from non-epistemically circular beliefs. (shrink)

We examine the interdependence between individual and group behavior surrounding a somewhat arbitrary, real‐world decision: selecting a name for one’s child. Using a historical database of the names given to children over the last century in the United States, we find that naming choices are influenced by both the frequency of a name in the general population, and by its ‘‘momentum’’ in the recent past in the sense that names which are growing in popularity are preferentially chosen. This bias toward (...) rising names is a recent phenomena: In the early part of the 20th century, increasing popularity of a name from one time period to the next correlated with a decrease in future popularity. However, more recently this trend has reversed. We evaluate a number of formal models that detail how individual decision‐making strategies, played out in a large population of interacting agents, can explain these empirical observations. We argue that cognitive capacities for change detection, the encoding of frequency in memory, and biases toward novel or incongruous stimuli may interact with the behavior of other decision makers to determine the distribution and dynamics of cultural tokens such as names. (shrink)

Is it possible for children with autism to live a good life, to flourish? Surprisingly, the answer is yes, given a particular understanding of flourishing. Our project is to explain the conception of flourishing that we have in mind and explain how children with autism may come to flourish.Instead of constructing an account of a good life from the ground up for this project, Aristotle’s conception of a good life, of human flourishing, will be used. Using Aristotle’s paradigm of a (...) good life, the initial prognosis for children with autism flourishing is very poor. But this prognosis is made in the absence of children with autism receiving early intensive behavioral intervention using the science... (shrink)

While there has been a great deal of discussion of whether and when beliefs formed in an epistemically circular manner can be justified, there has been almost no discussion of exactly which beliefs are formed in a circular manner. These discussions have tended to focus on an extremely limited number of intuitively-identified paradigm examples concerning attempts to establish the reliability of a method of belief formation. Here, I seek to answer a prior analytical question about the nature of epistemic circularity (...) by developing a criterion which sorts epistemically circular beliefs from non-epistemically circular beliefs. (shrink)

Psychophysical studies of change blindness indicate that, at any instant, human observers are aware of detail in few parts of the visual field. Such results suggest, to some theorists, that human vision reconstructs only a few portions of the visual scene and that, to bridge the resulting representational gaps, it often lets physical objects serve as their own short-term memory. We propose that human vision reconstructs no portion of the visual scene, and that it never lets physical objects serve as (...) their own short-term memory. (shrink)

While there has been a great deal of discussion of whether and when beliefs formed in an epistemically circular manner can be justified, there has been almost no discussion of exactly which beliefs are formed in a circular manner. Here, I discuss two possible accounts of when a belief is formed in an epistemically circular manner, arguing that both have serious problems, and should thus be rejected. Seeing where they founder points the way to a better attempt at a criterion (...) of epistemically circular belief. (shrink)

Rules and similarity refer to qualitatively different processes. The classification of a stimulus by rules involves abstract and usually domain-specific knowledge operating primarily on the target representation. In contrast, similarity is a relation between the target representation and another representation of the same type. It is also useful to distinguish associationist processes as a third type of cognitive process.

Bennett and Schumacher’s postselected quantum teleportation is a model of closed timelike curves (CTCs) that leads to results physically different from Deutsch’s model. We show that even a single qubit passing through a postselected CTC (P-CTC) is sufficient to do any postselected quantum measurement with certainty, and we discuss an important difference between “Deutschian” CTCs (D-CTCs) and P-CTCs in which the future existence of a P-CTC might affect the present outcome of an experiment. Then, based on a suggestion of Bennett (...) and Smith, we explicitly show how a party assisted by P-CTCs can distinguish a set of linearly independent quantum states, and we prove that it is not possible for such a party to distinguish a set of linearly dependent states. The power of P-CTCs is thus weaker than that of D-CTCs because the Holevo bound still applies to circuits using them, regardless of their ability to conspire in violating the uncertainty principle. We then discuss how different notions of a quantum mixture that are indistinguishable in linear quantum mechanics lead to dramatically differing conclusions in a nonlinear quantum mechanics involving P-CTCs. Finally, we give explicit circuit constructions that can efficiently factor integers, efficiently solve any decision problem in the intersection of NP and coNP, and probabilistically solve any decision problem in NP. These circuits accomplish these tasks with just one qubit traveling back in time, and they exploit the ability of postselected closed timelike curves to create grandfather paradoxes for invalid answers. (shrink)

Young men are more distressed by a partner’s sexual infidelity, whereas young women are more distressed by a partner’s emotional infidelity. The present research investigated (a) whether the sex difference in jealousy replicates in an older sample, and (b) whether younger people differ from older people in their selection of the more distressing infidelity scenario. We presented forced-choice dilemmas to 202 older people (mean age = 67 years) and to 234 younger people (mean age = 20 years). The sex difference (...) replicated in the older sample. In addition, older women were less likely than younger women to select a partner’s emotional infidelity as more distressing than a partner’s sexual infidelity. Discussion offers directions for future work on sex differences and age differences in jealousy. (shrink)

How can anyone be rational in a world where knowledge is limited, time is pressing, and deep thought is often an unattainable luxury? Traditional models of unbounded rationality and optimization in cognitive science, economics, and animal behavior have tended to view decision-makers as possessing supernatural powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and endless time. But understanding decisions in the real world requires a more psychologically plausible notion of bounded rationality. In Simple heuristics that make us smart (Gigerenzer et al. 1999), we (...) explore fast and frugal heuristics – simple rules in the mind's adaptive toolbox for making decisions with realistic mental resources. These heuristics can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices quickly and with a minimum of information by exploiting the way that information is structured in particular environments. In this précis, we show how simple building blocks that control information search, stop search, and make decisions can be put together to form classes of heuristics, including: ignorance-based and one-reason decision making for choice, elimination models for categorization, and satisficing heuristics for sequential search. These simple heuristics perform comparably to more complex algorithms, particularly when generalizing to new data – that is, simplicity leads to robustness. We present evidence regarding when people use simple heuristics and describe the challenges to be addressed by this research program. Key Words: adaptive toolbox; bounded rationality; decision making; elimination models; environment structure; heuristics; ignorance-based reasoning; limited information search; robustness; satisficing; simplicity. (shrink)

Today's pre-service teachers grew up attending schools where high stakes testing and teacher accountability were the norm. Despite a substantial body of research focused on the influence high-stakes testing on the practices of novice social studies teachers, a gap exists regarding the accountability movement's influence on novice social studies teachers. This study focused explicitly on the influence high-stakes testing and the culture of accountability had on two pre-service social studies teachers during their student teaching experience. Our findings highlight the ways (...) the accountability culture of public schools served a narrow gatekeeping function, limiting what participants learned during student teaching. Rethinking gatekeeping during student teaching within the current era of accountability and oversight positions teacher educators to confront the constricting nature of student teaching today. Student teachers must learn to recognize the gatekeeping aspects of the accountability culture and to make sense of the contradictions embedded in the student teaching experience. (shrink)

Traditional views of rationality posit general-purpose decision mechanisms based on logic or optimization. The study of ecological rationality focuses on uncovering the “adaptive toolbox” of domain-specific simple heuristics that real, computationally bounded minds employ, and explaining how these heuristics produce accurate decisions by exploiting the structures of information in the environments in which they are applied. Knowing when and how people use particular heuristics can facilitate the shaping of environments to engender better decisions.

Demonstrating cetacean communicative cultures requires documenting vocal differences among conspecific groups that are socially learned and stable across generations. Evidence to date does not provide strong scientific support for culture in cetacean vocal systems. Further, functional analyses with playbacks are needed to determine whether observed group differences in vocalizations are meaningful to the animals themselves.

This case involves invasive research on captive wild populations of birds to study aggressive animal behavior. The case and associated commentaries raise and examine fundamental issues: whether and under what conditions, such research is ethically justified when the research has no expected, direct application to the human species; the moral status of animals and how one balances concern for the animal’s interests against the value of gains in scientific knowledge. They also emphasize the issue of the importance of a thorough (...) literature search to ensure appropriate research design and experimental design to minimize animal suffering. It raises the issue of circumstances in which such research should be modified or terminated. (shrink)

This essay provides an intuitive technique that illustrates why a conditional must be true when the antecedent is false and the consequent is either true or false. Other techniques for explaining the conditional’s truth table are unsatisfactory.

If applied behavior analysis works as claimed by Furman and Tuminello, then both Schlinger and Potter agree that ABA could, in principle, be an aid for solving many more problems than just those associated with autism spectrum disorder. Does ABA work for children with ASD as Furman and Tuminello claim? Schlinger believes that ABA can, in fact, solve developmental and behavioral problems associated with ASD for some children to the point that those children might flourish in the Aristotelian sense. On (...) the other hand, Potter does not believe that ABA can, in fact, elevate children with ASD to the level of Aristotelian flourishing.Schlinger may be predisposed to agree with Furman and... (shrink)

While theories of rationality and decision making typically adopt either a single-powertool perspective or a bag-of-tricks mentality, the research program of ecological rationality bridges these with a theoretically-driven account of when different heuristic decision mechanisms will work well. Here we described two ways to study how heuristics match their ecological setting: The bottom-up approach starts with psychologically plausible building blocks that are combined to create simple heuristics that fit specific environments. The top-down approach starts from the statistical problem facing the (...) organism and a set of principles, such as the bias– variance tradeoff, that can explain when and why heuristics work in uncertain environments, and then shows how effective heuristics can be built by biasing and simplifying more complex models. We conclude with challenges these approaches face in developing a psychologically realistic perspective on human rationality. (shrink)

We investigated whether (a) people positively reevaluate the characters of recently dead others and (b) supernatural primes concerning an ambient dead agent serve to curb selfish intentions. In Study 1, participants made trait attributions to three strangers depicted in photographs; one week later, they returned to do the same but were informed that one of the strangers had died over the weekend. Participants rated the decedent target more favorably after learning of his death whereas ratings for the control targets remained (...) unchanged between sessions. This effect was especially pronounced for traits dealing with the decedent’s prosocial tendencies (e.g., ethical, kind). In Study 2, a content analysis of obituaries revealed a similar emphasis on decedents’ prosocial attributes over other personality dimensions (e.g., achievement-relatedness, social skills). Finally, in Study 3, participants who were told of an alleged ghost in the laboratory were less likely to cheat on a competitive task than those who did not receive this supernatural prime. The findings are interpreted as evidence suggestive of adaptive design. (shrink)